Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy
Volume 9
Issue 1 The ADA at 25: Disability Rights and the
Health Care Workforce

Article 8

2015

Transforming the Physician’s Standard of Care in the Context of
Whole Genome Sequencing Technologies: Finding Guidance in
Best Practice Standards
Matthew Joseph Westbrook
mwestbr3@slu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew J. Westbrook, Transforming the Physician’s Standard of Care in the Context of Whole Genome
Sequencing Technologies: Finding Guidance in Best Practice Standards, 9 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol'y
(2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol9/iss1/8

This Student Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRANSFORMING THE PHYSICIAN’S STANDARD OF CARE IN THE
CONTEXT OF WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING TECHNOLOGIES:
FINDING GUIDANCE IN BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS

I. INTRODUCTION
Personalized medicine has entered the clinical setting and is complicating
the physician-patient relationship. With the advent of new genetic testing
technologies, determining whether a physician has a “duty to warn” and a
“duty of care” regarding certain genetic dispositions is becoming ever more
complex and still remains fundamental to determining whether a physician
may be held liable for failing to conform to the standard of care. As history has
demonstrated, the risk for medical malpractice litigation increases with the
introduction of new information that may affect the clinical relationship. 1
Certain types of genetic testing technologies, such as whole genome
sequencing, are a driving force in an overall vision for personalized medicine
that delivers information more efficiently and achieves meaningful outcomes
for patients via narrow-focused prevention and treatment methods. However,
advancements in whole genome sequencing technologies have outpaced a
physician’s ability to manage and interpret the voluminous amount of
information being generated. As genetic testing technologies become more
sophisticated and robust and as they continue generating voluminous amounts
of information, the physician’s standard of care will need to transform
accordingly to account for the reality of these changes. 2
Although “considerable progress has been made in mapping the sequence
of the human genome and identifying sources of human genetic variation,” 3

1. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, Personalized Medicine and Genetic
Malpractice, 15 GENETICS MED. 913, 921 (2013) (stating a probable cause of this increase in
litigation involves the presumed connection between the belief that the more a provider is capable
of doing, then the more a provider should do, which means that more can go wrong and lead to a
lawsuit).
2. Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-toConsumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 680 (2014) (expressing the
view that the reality is concerning for the clinical context because genetic testing has rapidly
transitioned from one of discrete testing looking at single genes to large-scale genetic testing (or
genomic sequencing), which has shown to return information about many or all of a patient or
consumer’s genes, and many of these are still lacking in function or significance).
3. THE COUNCIL ON SCI. & PUB. HEALTH, RESOL. 422, A-05: GENOMIC AND MOLECULARBASED PERSONALIZED HEALTH CARE, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/topics/per
sonalized-medicine.page (last visited Dec. 19, 2015) [hereinafter RESOL. 422, A-05]. For
111
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there is still a high level of uncertainty pertaining to the genotype-phenotype
associations that are generated through whole genome sequencing. 4 Current
medical standards of care do not account for these types of technologies
because the threshold has yet to be defined. The specific threshold of concern
here involves clinical utility. 5 Consequently, there is a risk for physicians being
held liable for failing to meet an expected standard of care when that standard
has yet to be defined. With integration into the health care delivery system still
in its infancy and personal genetic information becoming more readily
available, genetic testing technologies such as whole genome sequencing pose
certain challenges that must properly be addressed if the potential of this form
of personalized medicine is to be realized with meaningful utility. 6
Specifically, the standard of care ethically and legally expected of physicians
will need to appropriately transform as the threshold is being defined in the
clinical context within the scope of the physician-patient relationship.
While some argue for a more cautious approach to clinical implementation,
particularly asserting that genetic testing technologies are still in their infancy
and the generated results cannot be interpreted with much clinical utility, 7 this
article argues that despite the considerable amount of uncertainty pertaining to
the threshold by which whole genome sequencing information is used with
clinical utility, physicians are only one step away from being held accountable
and there is a current legal framework by which this standard may begin to
take shape. This accountability would only be triggered after physicians
receive thorough education that is similar to genetic counselors and is informed
by best practice standards, and after the threshold of clinical utility has been
more fully defined and met.
Accordingly, this article examines how the physician’s standard of care
will be shaped by the reality of whole genome sequencing. Part II provides
background information to personalized medicine and whole genome
example, “[c]onstruction of genetic maps and the identification of conserved haplotypes promises
to assist in the search for genes that convey risk, or protection from, chronic diseases.” Id.; see
also NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST. AT THE NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT (2015), http://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/Pdfs/HumanGenomeProject(NH
GRI).pdf.
4. See Isaac S. Kohane et al., The Incidentalome: A Threat to Genomic Medicine, 296
[J]AMA 212, 212 (2006).
5. See infra Section II.B.1. The threshold necessarily involves the relationship between and
among analytic validity and clinical validity, as they relate to clinical utility. Id.
6. See, e.g., Matthew J. Westbrook et al., Mapping the Incidentalome: Estimating
Incidental Findings Generated Through Clinical Pharmacogenomics Testing, 15 GENETICS MED.
325, 325 (2013); see also Kohane et al., supra note 4; Amy L. McGuire & Wylie Burke, An
Unwelcome Side Effect of Direct-To-Consumer Personal Genome Testing: Raiding the Medical
Commons, 300 [J]AMA 2669, 2671 (2008).
7. See, e.g., Wylie Burke et al., Seeking Genomic Knowledge: The Case for Clinical
Restraint, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 1649, 1649 (2013).
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sequencing, articulates their promise for the future of health care, and
examines certain threshold issues and barriers to its clinical implementation.
Part III provides a rule-centric, legal framework by which a standard of care
and subsequent liability may take form for physicians with the advent of whole
genome sequencing and in consideration of its emerging issues. Part IV
considers the aforementioned historical background, the threshold issues and
barriers to clinical implementation, and the established legal precedent to offer
guidance as to how physicians may best educate themselves, the referential
professions in which they may find best practice standards, and the future
implications for negligence liability as the current standard of care reacts to
and is transformed by whole genome sequencing testing technologies.
This last part offers a new way to contextualize the physician’s role in
addressing, communicating, and educating patients of their genetic
susceptibility for certain diseases, illnesses, and conditions. The proposal is
analogous to genetic counselors and is premised upon uncovering those best
practices that physicians may take advantage of when faced with a situation
where they may not have the requisite knowledge to adequately educate
patients and where patients might not comparably respond to seemingly similar
genetic information. Clinical utility is the turning point for re-defining and
transforming a physician’s standard of care as it relates to whole genome
sequencing. The bridge between these is premised on a revised “duty to warn,”
which is based upon a threshold of foreseeability, and adequate education, as
informed and guided by best practice standards. Framing the standard of care
upon a foreseeability doctrine in the context of whole genome sequencing may
allow for meaningful interpretation of those findings generated through the
genetic testing technology. Before one may understand the implications of
what this means for physicians, patients, and their relationship to one another
in the clinical setting, the emerging genomic landscape upon which this
discourse takes root needs to be established and illustrated.
II. PARSING THROUGH AND UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGING GENOMIC
LANDSCAPE
A.

Background of Personalized Medicine and Whole Genome Sequencing

Personalized medicine holds promise for the future health and well-being
of many patients. 8 Understanding the human genome through a variety of
genetic testing technologies, including whole genome sequencing, is important
for better capturing the nature and etiology of disease so that pharmaceutical

8. And President Obama’s recent announcement for his “Precision Medicine Initiative” is
evidence of a future investment in the advancement in and use of personalized medicine
methodologies. WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S
PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE (2015).
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drugs and therapies may be directly tailored for each patient’s particular
genetic makeup. 9 The availability of information related to the human genome
has become more widespread at a reduced cost, 10 and the genetic testing
technologies themselves have become more sophisticated, revealing more
nuanced information than ever before. 11 As such, before engaging in an ethical
and legal discourse pertaining to the potential challenges facing physicians on
one side of the clinical equation, one must first understand the nature of
personalized medicine and whole genome sequencing, and why they offer
benefits and pose potential risks for patients and their relationship to their
physicians now and in the future.
Personalized medicine is health care that is “informed by each person’s
unique clinical, genetic and environmental information.” 12 Physicians have
benefitted greatly from the inclusion of personalized medicine in the clinical
setting, 13 by enabling them to “more easily detect individual differences [] in
susceptibility to particular diseases or [] in responses to specific treatments and
to then tailor preventive and therapeutic interventions to optimize benefit and
minimize harm.” 14 An example of how physicians have tailored patient
treatment plans is with greater information on the pharmaceutical drug
warfarin. 15 Advancements have enabled physicians to better understand when

9. Policy Perspective on Personalized Medicine, AM. MED. ASS’N (2013), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/topics/personalized-medicine.page [hereinafter
AMA
Policy
Perspective]; see also THE COUNCIL ON SCI. & PUB. HEALTH, REPORT 4 (A-10), GENOMICBASED PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 1, https://download.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/csaph/x-pub/
a10csaph4-summary.pdf [hereinafter CSAPH].
10. See Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at 688; see also SANCY A. LEACHMAN ET
AL., EDUCATIONAL BOOK: DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING: PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE IN EVOLUTION 34 (2011); Richard R. Sharp, Downsizing Genomic Medicine:
Approaching the Ethical Complexity of Whole-Genome Sequencing by Starting Small, 13
GENETICS MED. 191, 191 (2011) (“Although the field of genomics has been driven largely by
technological innovation, we are rapidly approaching a time when neither capacity nor
genotyping costs are limiting factors in the emergence of genomic medicine.”).
11. See Sean D. Mooney, Progress Towards the Integration of Pharmacogenomics in
Practice, 134 HUM. GENETICS 459, 460 (2015).
12. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 2; see also CSAPH, supra note 9.
13. RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3, at 1. “The mapping of the human genome [which
arguably initiated the movement towards personalized medicine from a pharmacogenomics
perspective] coupled with the abilities to measure the function of genes. . .offers the possibility
that a patient’s genome can be analyzed in order to choose appropriate diagnostic and therapeutic
strategies, including preventative measures.” Id. These features hold great promise for
personalized medicine.
14. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 2.
15. See Guang-Ming Tan et al., Role of Warfarin Pharmacogenetic Testing in Clinical
Practice, 11 PHARMACOGENOMICS 439, 439 (2010), http://www.gbcbiotech.com/laboratorio/
assets/role-of-warfarin-pharmacogenetic-testing-in-clinical-practice.pdf (“Variations
in
two
genes, VKORC1 and CYP2C9, have been associated with variation in warfarin metabolism
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a particular variation of either one of two genes (VKORC1 and CYP2CP) 16
will cause a patient to be more susceptible to an adverse health event when
taking the drug. 17 Personalized medicine’s successful implementation into the
clinical setting also has potential cost reduction benefits not only to physicians,
but also to health care providers, institutions, and the patient. 18
These personalized medicine realizations can be attributed, in part, to the
advent of whole genome sequencing, which continues to be a driving force for
revealing the nuances of certain genetic variants. Whole genome sequencing is
a form of genetic testing technology 19 that measures variation in one’s whole
DNA sequence. 20 As a medical screening tool used by physicians, it strives to
identify a disease or marker in patients, 21 and has demonstrated a considerable
amount of value in:

among individuals. Some of this variation includes longer dose stabilization time, higher risk of
serious or life-threatening bleeding, and increased risk of other adverse health events. Physicians
have been able to utilize pharmacogenetic testing to determine whether a patient will be more or
less susceptible to having an adverse event by virtue of having a particular variant on either of the
two genes. As a result, physicians may choose to prescribe another drug for the same
anticoagulation treatment purpose.”); see also RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3, at 6 (“A hallmark
of drug disposition, for example, is large interindividual variability. Such variability is a major
reason why patients differ in their responses to standard doses of a drug. A combination of
genetic, environmental, and disease-state factors affect drug disposition, with the relative
contribution of each, depending on the specific drug and disease.”).
16. See Simone Rost et al., Mutations in VKORC1 Cause Warfarin Resistance and Multiple
Coagulation Factor Deficiency Type 2, 427 NATURE 537, 541 (2004); Ann K. Daly et al.,
CYP2CP Polymorphism and Warfarin Dose Requirements 53 BRIT. J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 403, 408 (2002).
17. See Tan et al., supra note 15. For patients with genetic variants of VKORC1 and
CYP2CP, there is an increase in the risk of hemorrhage. Id.
18. See, e.g., AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9. As with any new technology, costs to
hospitals and/or providers substantially increase. Id. However, personalized medicine services
have the “potential to significantly reduce waste and improve health outcomes by ensuring care is
delivered earlier and with treatments that have a higher likelihood of success.” Id. The adoption
of personalized medicine in the clinical setting also has the potential to reduce overall costs by
“shorten[ing] the diagnostic journey for those with rare conditions or diseases.” Id.
19. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2. In a footnote, the authors clarify a distinction
between “genetic testing” and “genomic testing” that is important for the scope of this article. See
id. at 680 n.12 (“[T]he term ‘genomic testing’ [] mean[s] large-scale or whole genome testing
(i.e., testing most if not all of a person’s nuclear DNA). The term ‘genetic testing’ can also
include whole genome analysis as well as looking at only one or several discrete genes.
Therefore, while all genomic testing is also appropriately described as genetic testing, not all
genetic testing includes the analysis of enough genes to be considered genomic testing.”).
Accordingly, for purposes of this article, whole genome sequencing/testing is synonymous with
genomic testing as it directly relates to the physician-patient encounter in the clinical setting.
20. Burke et al., supra note 7, at 1650.
21. Mark A. Rothstein, The Case Against Precipitous, Population-Wide, Whole-Genome
Sequencing 40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 682, 682 (2012).
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elucidating the genetic etiology of rare disorders, in identifying atypical
variants in common diseases, in determining pharmacogenomically appropriate
drugs and dosages, in performing tumor genome sequencing, and in aiding
other clinical applications for the diagnosis and treatment of individuals who
are symptomatic or whose family health history places them at substantial
22
risk.

Advancements in testing accuracy and information generation 23 have paved the
way for whole genome sequencing testing technologies to become more
affordable to consumers and more available for widespread use in the clinical
setting. 24 This reality also brings to light certain fundamental issues facing the
physician-patient relationship. 25 Whole genome sequencing has allowed for the
uncovering of information that was not previously known and, as a result, is
not yet understood and cannot be adequately interpreted. 26 Recognizing and
addressing these issues are central to the successful implementation of

22. Id.
23. Robert Pear, U.S. Introduces New DNA Standard for Ensuring Accuracy of Genetic
Tests, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/health/new-way-toensure-accuracy-of-dna-tests-us-announces.html?_r=0. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology, after collaborating with the Food and Drug Administration has made significant
strides in developing a standard to ensure the accuracy and reliability of genetic testing
technologies. Id. By way of “reference materials,” which includes deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
of a Utah woman of European ancestry, scientists and laboratories may now demonstrate the
quality of the DNA sequencing and the confidence in pinpointing specific mutations and devising
tailored treatments that may be used in clinical practice for the benefit of patients. Id. Health
insurance companies recognizing the increased trustworthiness of these genome-based tests may
also be more likely to cover them under their plans. Id. This standard also benefits federal
government regulators by reducing the variance of results among laboratories and thus decreasing
the likelihood of wrongful diagnosis and treatment, especially given genetic testing’s growing
importance in these clinical decisions. Id. Moreover, this technological development is in-step
with President Obama’s “Precision Medicine Initiative,” which is aimed at fostering the
development and adoption of customized treatments to the benefit of health care providers and
their patients. Pear, supra note 23.
24. See generally Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2 (elaborating on what each direct-toconsumer provider offers to the public). For example, Illumina, Knome, deCODEme,
FamilyTreeDNA, 23andMe, and openSNP—at one point each offered consumers with the
opportunity to access their genetic information at a low-cost. Id.
25. See, e.g., AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9. Some of the issues permeating
personalized medicine include (1) “well-informed, voluntary consent, including implications for
biologically related others and appropriate counseling” and (2) “protection of
privacy/confidentiality to prevent unauthorized/inappropriate use of personal genetic information,
including constraints on access to information by third parties.” Id. at 2.
26. Greer Donley et al., Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should
We? 42 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 32 (2012), quoted in Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at
685 (“As technologies for sequencing genetic material increasingly allow for rapid sequencing for
large amounts of DNA, our technological capacity for discovering variants outpaces scientific
understanding regarding their consequences for individuals.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

TRANSFORMING THE PHYSICIAN’S STANDARD OF CARE

117

personalized medicine. Potential resolutions to these issues are contingent
upon other threshold issues and barriers pertinent to the incorporation of this
information in the clinical setting.
B.

Threshold Issues with and Barriers to Clinical Implementation

There are many issues and “barriers confront[ing] the development and
implementation of genetically based, personalized health care.” 27 Among these
include: determining the analytic validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility
of genetic testing results; patient preferences and behavior, trait variations, and
a general lack of education; inadequate genetic education among physicians;
and, as argued here, a lack of a defined standard of care upon which physicians
may be held accountable in the clinical setting. 28
1. Analytic Validity, Clinical Validity, and Clinical Utility
It is generally accepted that rare genetic diseases are considered the context
by which genetic testing primarily enters the clinical setting for particular
patients. 29 The incidence of genetic variations producing a clinical phenotype
and disease is extremely rare. 30 A genetic variation that is absolutely indicative
of a phenotype (i.e., manifestation of a disease) is the huntingtin (HTT) genetic
mutation with Huntington’s disease. 31 The relationship between ordering a
genetic test because a patient presents with symptoms potentially indicating
Huntington’s disease, that test revealing the specific HTT genetic mutation,
and a physician adequately communicating that information in a meaningful
way to the patient is the archetypical connection demonstrating analytic
validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility.
In addition to the diagnostic testing available to determine if one has or
will develop Huntington’s disease, there is a diagnostic assay testing approach
used to identify thousands of genes and evaluate the impact of those genes on
genetic risks. 32 However, it is insufficient for establishing the genetic risks for
other diseases, illnesses, or conditions, such as hypertension, diabetes, and

27. RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3, at 1.
28. Id. Other considerations also include the overarching reality that “pharmacogenomics
and personalized medicine are being introduced into a fragmented health care system confronted
by significant disparities in health status, health care delivery, and access.” Id.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. See Francis O. Walker, Huntington’s Disease, 369 LANCET 218, 218 (2007); see infra
Part IV.B. (showing there is more scientific evidence establishing yet another causal relationship
similar to that of the HTT mutation and Huntington’s). Evidence suggests that a genetic variation
on BRCA causes breast cancer in women. Id.
32. RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3, at 3. This approach is used to identify the genetic risks
associated with any number of genetic variations for Mendelian disorder. Id.
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coronary artery disease. 33 This is due to the fact that the relationship between
and among analytic validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility is not firmly
established with sufficient evidence. Some evidentiary challenges embedded in
and facing genomics include: a lack of comparative outcomes data for genomic
applications due to regulatory and reimbursement policies that do not require
such studies and their inherent costs; the relative ease of market access for
genomic tests, including direct to consumer testing, which makes the lack of
evidence more problematic; 34 and, a lack of consensus on evidentiary
requirements for genomic test evaluation. 35 Considering the aforementioned
context, a brief overview of analytic validity, clinical validity, and clinical
utility and their relationship to each other provides a sufficient foundation upon
which one may begin to understand the impact of the challenges associated
with whole genome sequencing.
Analytic validity involves the “recognition of a genetic variant [on a
particular gene],” specifically by a laboratory. 36 Ensuring analytic validity is
the first step towards any genetic variant potentially having clinical
significance, and this is safeguarded through the regulatory authority of the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA). 37 CLIA has the
responsibility of ensuring that those laboratories performing genetic testing
“establish and maintain the accuracy of its testing procedures.” 38 Analytic
validity is a necessary step “toward ensuring clinical validity.” 39
Clinical validity is defined as “the accuracy with which a particular finding
predicts the presence or absence of the underlying condition.” 40 The
“[l]ikelihood of disease can depend on other genetic, environmental or
stochastic factors that have not been, or cannot yet be, determined, leaving a
degree of uncertainty.” 41 Clarity and certainty are key determinants for clinical

33. Id.
34. See, e.g., SEC’Y ADVISORY COMM’N ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO
THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2008), http://osp.od.nih.
gov/sites/default/files/SACGHS_oversight_report.pdf (reporting that there are gaps, for example,
in the area of the evidence of clinical validity and utility for most direct-to-consumer genetic
tests).
35. Muin J. Khoury et al., Evidence-Based Classification of Recommendations on Use of
Genomic Tests in Clinical Practice: Dealing with Insufficient Evidence, 12 GENETICS MED. 680,
680 (2010).
36. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at 720-21.
37. Id. at 720. CLIA is regulated by The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Id. at
719-20.
38. 42 C.F.R. § 493.801(a)(2)(ii) (2015).
39. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at 721.
40. Shiri Shkedi-Rafid et al., Defining and Managing Incidental Findings in Genetic and
Genomic Practice, 51 J. MED. GENETICS 715, 718 (2014).
41. Id.
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validity. Through these determinants, one may better understand the
relationship between analytic validity and clinical validity: while analytic
validity is the first and necessary step towards a genetic variant having any
potential clinical validity, it is not a sufficient step. 42 However, the more salient
issue with whole genome sequencing, similar to other large-scale, genomic
tests, still remains rooted in determining clinical validity and clinical utility—
the latter of which is of utmost importance and concern for the future of
personalized medicine and the roles of physicians in the clinical transformation
as a result.
Clinical utility will be the key determinant for a physician’s ability to
meaningfully educate a patient and provide guidance that satisfies the standard
of care, once that standard of care has been defined in the particular context of
whole genome sequencing. The threshold of clinical utility has been a focal
point, for example, for contention about the disclosure of incidental findings. 43
It is in this particular context of incidental findings that a variety of definitions
of clinical utility have emerged, which are still nonetheless applicable for this
article’s purpose. In the broadest sense possible, clinical utility “refers to
whether the finding could lead to a medical intervention . . . that could improve
health outcomes.” 44 Determining this clinical utility has presented physicians
with multiple practical difficulties, including: uncertainties about when and for
whom results have clinical utility; 45 “novel findings not previously described
in the literature;” 46 and personal utility. 47

42. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at 721. For example, a genetic “test that satisfies
the highest analytic standards might nevertheless produce genetic information that is inaccurate if
the association between the genetic variation and clinical manifestation of disease is not strong.”
Id.
43. See Shkedi-Rafid et al., supra note 40; see also Gary E. Marchant et al., Physician
Liability: The Next Big Thing for Personalized Medicine? 8 PERSONALIZED MED. 457, 457
(2011). The authors detail the differences in argument. On the one hand, “some experts claim that
certain personalized medicine techniques are ready for clinical application today and several
leading medical institutions have begun to deploy such techniques.” Id. On the other hand, others
are more skeptical about deployment of personalized medicine because they are not ready for
widespread adoption because of uncertainty and disagreement over the clinical utility and validity
of certain results. Id. at 459.
44. Shkedi-Rafid et al., supra note 40, at 716. A medical intervention may include
“treatment, risk-reducing surgery and/or surveillance.” Id. As the authors have argued, “[t]he
greater the potential benefit that a medical intervention could provide, the greater the perceived
onus to disclose. Potential clinical benefit needs to be weighed against the potential harm of
disclosing the [incidental finding] (such as distress and uncertainty) especially if no specific
consent has been given at the time of testing.” Id.
45. Id. For example, “[i]nternational guidelines suggest[ing] that children not being tested
for adult-onset genetic conditions until there is a medical benefit or until [the children] can decide
[themselves] if and when to be tested. By contrast, the ACMG holds that the potential benefits to
adult family members outweigh the potential harms of disclosing findings that do not have
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While the aforementioned was provided in the context of incidental
findings, as those genetic testing results pose a whole host of challenges in and
of themselves, 48 the issue of clinical utility remains important and guiding for
clinical implementation and holding physicians to an expected standard of
care. 49 To date, whole genome sequencing (or any other genetic tests)
continues to demonstrate the insufficiency of evidence for clinical utility,
coupled with other challenges to clinical validity, for their meaningful use in
clinical practice. 50 Some of the evidentiary challenges facing the field of
genomics involve lack of information. 51 On the specific issue of the
insufficiency of the evidence, some have approached the associated problems
by way of analogous methodologies in other medical contexts. 52 “Shared
decision making” has been recommended as one way for physicians to
appropriately approach the insufficient evidence issue. 53 Other information is

immediate clinical utility for the child, at least in the near future when parents are not likely to
otherwise have access to genomic tests.” Id. at 716-18.
46. Shkedi-Rafid et al., supra note 40, at 718. Evidence for pathogenicity is sometimes not
apparent in some findings. Some clarification might be attained via studies of the finding or
familial segregation studies. Careful communication is warranted here. Id.
47. Id. “Some results will lack clinical utility because there are no available medical
interventions.” Id. However, “individuals could still consider these findings useful to know about
because the knowledge would lead them to choose different reproductive options or make
lifestyle and health behavior changes.” Id. at 719. Disclosure of such results that might not have
clinical utility but nevertheless personal utility becomes the issue to be resolved. Id.
48. See, e.g., Kohane et al., supra note 4.
49. See Shkedi-Rafid et al., supra note 40. Concerns about the clinical utility of genetic
testing results have permeated the clinical setting. “As the genetic code is investigated in more
detail, healthcare professionals will need to consider more downstream consequences of testing.
[This down streaming] means that testing will be done in settings where clinicians have little
experience of genetics/genomics.” Id. at 719. Some have expressed concern about whether
consumers have been provided adequate information pertaining to findings and the concern has
been amplified by consumers receiving results, for example, when consumers receive the results
“without an explanation from a clinician or researcher.” Id. at 720. “The rise of such testing has
also raised concerns about consumers turning to and overburdening the health service to interpret
test results not clinically indicated.” Id.
50. Khoury et al., supra note 35, at 680. However, “explicit and quantitative tools can be
used in the evaluation of direct and indirect evidence on the utility of genomic [issues],” e.g., a
recommendation matrix as proposed by Veenstra et al., which can be developed based on the
amount of certainty of the evidence and the assessment of the risk-benefit profile. See David L.
Veenstra et al., A Formal Risk-Benefit Framework for Genomic Tests: Facilitating the
Appropriate Translation of Genomics into Clinical Practice, 12 GENETICS MED. 686, 691 (2010).
51. Khoury et al., supra note 35, at 680.
52. Id. at 681.
53. Id. This “shared decision making” recommendation has been argued “as an appropriate
approach for services for which evidence was insufficient, or the balance of benefits and harms
was weakly positive or would vary depending on individual values or preferences.” Id. This
involves a process in which the patient “(1) understands the risk or seriousness of the disease or
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also available to help clinicians with their decision making in this context,
which involves the balancing of harms and benefits of a particular genetic
testing service. 54 Nevertheless, progress has been made in developing a
methodology to counter the evidentiary challenge of translating genomic
discoveries into health benefits, 55 and proposals have relied upon genetic
counseling for guidance in, for example, shared decision-making models. 56
This progress is clearly being demonstrated in the Evaluation of Genomic
Applications in Practice and Prevention (EGAPP) Working Group, 57 which
was established “for the purpose of adapting existing evidence review methods
to the systematic evaluation of genomic tests and to link scientific evidence to
recommendations for the clinical use of genomic tests, thereby addressing the
challenges posed by complex and rapidly emerging genomic applications.” 58
Consequently, improving the “efficiency of a robust, evidence-based
recommendation process” 59 has certain implications. 60 Categorizing and

condition to be prevented; (2) understands the preventive service, including the risks, benefits,
alternatives, and uncertainties; (3) has weighed his or her values regarding the potential benefits
and harms associated with the service; (4) and has engaged in decision making at a level at which
he or she desires and feels comfortable.” Id.
54. Id. “The USPSTF . . . provide[d] additional information to clinicians to help with
decision making in the context of insufficient information on the balance of harms and benefits of
a service . . . . [The USPSTF has detailed] four ‘domains’ [of importance]: the potential burden of
disease that might be prevented by an effective service, potential harms from such a service,
costs–including opportunity costs–of widespread use of the service, and a description of current
practice.” Id.
55. E.g., id. at 680. For example, “The Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in
Newborns and Children evaluates genomic tests for use in newborn screening panels. The
Evaluation of Genomic Applications in Practice and Prevention Working Group (EGAPP)
provides an evidence-based assessment of genomic tests and other applications that are in
transition from research to clinical and public health practice.” See also id. (arguing insufficient
evidence facing genomic medicine can be countered by the implementation of evidence-based
triaging of genomic applications for specific intended uses in practice). See generally, Veenstra et
al., supra note 50.
56. Khoury et al., supra note 35, at 681 (“[W]hen evidence is insufficient, the use of
informed or shared decision making is not new to the field of genetics . . . . [R]esearch on clinical
utility has been limited or entirely lacking, but genetic counseling, using a model similar to that of
informed/shared decision making has been effectively used for decades.”); Id. at 682 (proposal
for “genomic tests [to] be classified on the basis of available direct and indirect evidence into
three tiers (implement in routine practice, do not use [because of insufficient evidence], and
promote informed decision making). . . . [T]ests should have at least established analytic and
clinical validity even though final evidence of clinical utility may not be available.”).
57. See EVALUATION OF GENOMIC APPLICATIONS IN PRACTICE AND PREVENTION
(EGAPP), http://www.egappreviews.org/ (last visited June 12, 2015).
58. David L. Veenstra et al., Improving the Efficiency and Relevance of Evidence-Based
Recommendations in the Era of Whole-Genome Sequencing: An EGAPP Methods Update, 15
GENETICS MED. 14, 14 (2013).
59. Id. at 21.
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triaging whole genome sequencing results has been more thoroughly
investigated and proposed as an effective management tool. 61
2. Patient Preferences, Unique Trait Variations, and Lack of Education
Important considerations for the future success of whole genome
sequencing also includes patient preferences and acknowledging their general
lack of education. As statistics tend to support, “a significant percentage of the
population has low health literacy and a poor understanding (or fear) of science
and technology.” 62 Secondly, uncertainty not only exists for genetic variations
and incidence with diseases, illnesses, and conditions for patients generally,
but is further complicated if those variations are stratified by sex, age, race,
and ethnicity. 63 Where there is literature indicating that certain populations of a
particular region of the world have an overall risk of developing a particular
disease in the presence of a genetic variant, there is just as much literature
indicating a protective risk for that same genetic variation given the same
parameters of sex, age, race, and ethnicity. 64 Moreover, there are other studies
indicating that genetic variants shown to be linked with a certain illness or
disease are no more predictive than the parameters of sex, age, race, and
ethnicity, among others, in the first place. 65

60. Among these implications include the following: First, frameworks and updating, which
includes categorizing or triaging whole-genomic results that focus on expert-driven placement of
results into individual “bins” to provide guidance for return of results. See infra Section IV.D.
Second, evidence thresholds and value of future research, which involves the issue of relative
evidence threshold for recommending return of results to a patient versus recommending clinical
actions based on the result. Third, patient preferences and personal utility, the importance of
which involves providing methods for assessing patient preferences with respect to the possible
outcomes of genetic and genomic testing. Preferences and their variations need to reflect
individuals’ attitudes. See supra Section II.B. Lastly, stakeholder engagement because there is an
increasing level of interest in stakeholder engagement as a part of the comparative effectiveness
research movement, which makes it likely that approaches developed in that filed may be useful
for groups developing evidence-based recommendations, particularly given the potentially
conflicting objectives of guidelines that are expert informed and yet independent. See infra
Section IV.A.
61. See generally, Jonathan S. Berg et al., Deploying Whole Genome Sequencing in Clinical
Practice and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge One Bin at a Time, 13 GENETICS MED. 499,
499 (2011).
62. RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3, at 1.
63. Id. at 6.
64. See, e.g., Westbrook et al., supra note 6 (providing an empirical assessment of the
incidentalome through a systematic review of published articles reporting this data).
65. See Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer
Genomic Services in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 475, 482 (2012)
(reporting that of the many genetic variants linked to Type 2 diabetes, risk estimation of
developing the disease was better predicted by that individuals’ BMI, age, and sex). The lack of
determinative causality between genetic variants and development of an illness or disease has led
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In the specific context of the physician-patient relationship, which is of a
fiduciary nature, patients generally lack the adequate education to make fully
informed medical decisions without the aid of physicians. 66 Assessment of
one’s own health status is dependent upon, for example, a physician
“provid[ing] critical information about [one’s] medical well-being” so as to
“assist and direct [patients] in choosing necessary medical treatment.” 67 The
dependence is enhanced by the uncertainty involving whole genome
sequencing information, as it is a sophisticated technology offering
information that physicians are not even well-equipped to manage, interpret,
and meaningfully use. 68
3. Lack of Physician Education
As has been articulated up until this point, a central issue permeating the
successful implementation of whole genome sequencing into the clinical
setting predominantly involves clinical utility. As a direct consequence,
physicians face some of the most challenging issues as they are ill-equipped to
manage, interpret, and meaningfully advise patients of their test results
generated through whole genome sequencing. As some scholars have
acknowledged, “almost no clinician is capable of interpreting the
comprehensive results of [whole genome sequencing].” 69 Physicians are not
well-versed, educated, or proficient in genetics, genomics, or the interpretation
of said testing results. 70 Moreover, they have expressed concern about their
lack of familiarity with genetic tests 71 and, consequently, their lack of
some researchers to conclude that “currently known variants explain too little the risk of disease
occurrence to be of clinically useful predictive value.” Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at
688 (quoting Teri A. Manolio, Genomewide Association Studies and Assessment of the Risk of
Disease, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 166, 173 (2010)).
66. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty
to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1186 (2009)
(explaining where there is an appropriate duty to disclose to avoid or mitigate potential harm in
the context of emergent medical risks).
67. Id.
68. “This dependence is enhanced by the anxiety that patients typically feel about their
health, the vulnerability that they experience from a sickness or injury.” Id. See generally Thomas
L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to “Just
Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON
HALL L. REV. 335, 370-73 (2009).
69. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Managing Incidental Genomic Findings: Legal Obligations
of Clinicians, 15 GENETICS MED. 624, 626 (2013).
70. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 4.
71. UNITED HEALTH GRP., CTR. FOR HEALTH REFORM & DIAGNOSTICS, WORKING PAPER
7, PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW SCIENCE OF GENETIC
TESTING AND MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 23-24 (2012), http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/~/
media/UHG/PDF/2012/UNH-Working-Paper-7.ashx; see also UNITED HEALTH GRP., NEW
REPORT FINDS GREATER USE OF GENETIC TESTING, BUT HALF OF PHYSICIANS CONCERNED
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confidence to deal with “genetic-related issues that arise in the clinical
setting,” partly because the voluminous amount of information generated
through genetic testing technologies is unmanageable and uninterpretable to be
clinically significant for their patients. 72 As such, physicians have shown
concern that they may be prime targets of litigation if faced with a situation
involving the integration of personalized medicine in the form of genetic
testing results into the clinical setting. 73 Adequate education may lessen this
concern and minimize the litigation risk.
Reference materials on sequencing analysis might provide a step in the
right direction towards educating physicians. 74 Recognizing that “there are no
widely accepted genomic standards or quantitative performance metrics for
confidence in variant calling when sequencing genomes,” the National Institute
of Standards and Technology has begun developing reference materials
intended to enable translation of whole genome sequencing to clinical
applications. 75 These would be widely available for physician utilization in
daily clinical practices as use of whole genome sequencing test results become
more widespread and available for patients. 76
Also available for physicians is the genetic test registry (GTR) set up by
the National Institutes of Health, which aims at “providing to physicians and
other interested stakeholders information about every genetic test’s purpose,
methodology, validity, evidence of the test’s usefulness, and laboratory
contacts and credentials.” 77 The GTR represents a key initiative that facilitates

THEIR LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH GENETIC TESTS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.united
healthgroup.com/Newsroom/Articles/News/UnitedHealth%20Group/2012/0312GeneticTest
ing.aspx.
72. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 4.
73. Barbara J. Evans, Finding a Liability-Free Space in Which Personalized Medicine can
Bloom, 82 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 461, 461 (2007) (“There are two
schools of thought how tort liability may affect personalized medicine, i.e. whether fear of
lawsuits will tend to accelerate progress or slow it down . . . Physicians are concerned that they
will be prime targets of litigation. However, business structures for delivering personalized
medical services to patients are still evolving and no dominant business model has emerged. The
choice of business model(s) can affect the frequency and viability of lawsuits related to
pharmacogenetics. If litigation threatens to impede progress, there are ways to structure the
‘personalized medicine business’ to reduce lawsuit risks and promote speedier translation of this
promising science.”).
74. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 5.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Genetic Testing Registry, OFFICE OF SCI. POLICY, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-clinical-research-and-bioethics-policy/genetics-health-and-society/gtr
(last visited Dec. 23, 2015). The GTR is a free, centralized, online resource that provides
information about the genetic tests available. NIH clinical experts and members from the National
Center for Biotechnology Information Board of Scientific Counselors medical genetics working
group will be consultants about the content and structure of the GTR. Id.
ABOUT
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“standardization and access by practicing clinicians to information on genetic
testing.” 78
Considering the aforementioned issues and barriers to clinical
implementation, coupled with a sufficient background regarding whole
genome sequencing’s role in a vision for personalized medicine, the next step
in evaluating the standard of care and how it may be transformed is by
establishing a legal framework by which this discourse may take root.
III. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STANDARD OF CARE
Exploring whether legal precedent imposes upon physicians a duty to
disclose genetic risks was extensively considered subsequent to Congress’
launch of the Human Genome Project in 1989 and even before the project was
completed, and its fruits realized, fourteen years later. 79 To date, a standard of
care has not yet been established to account for the reality of whole genome
sequencing testing. A beginning point for framing the potential new standard
of care likely to emerge involves assessing the fundamental issues of
negligence liability as it relates to the standard of care and, more specifically,
legal precedent evaluating and holding on issues of foreseeability of imminent
danger.
A.

Standard of Care and Negligence Liability

The “standard of care” for determining a negligence action is defined as
the “prevailing professional practice.” 80 It is “what a reasonable [physician]

78. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 5-6 (Current Procedural Terminology (CPT)
codes will now be incorporated into the GTR, which will aid in building an infrastructure
supporting movement towards new genetic discoveries to clinical care and enhance reporting of
genetic tests and services.); see also, Genetic Testing Registry, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO.,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gtr (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). The GTR relies on voluntary
submission of genetic test information by providers for the information it makes available online.
The information provided includes the test’s purpose, methodology, validity, evidence of the
test’s usefulness, and laboratory contacts and credentials. The website’s homepage also provides
resource information including those pertaining to molecular genetics, clinical information on
genetic conditions, genetics professional listings, and consumer-friendly information about
genetic variation and human health.
79. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for
Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 151-52, 169 (1992) (articulating that
“[t]he sheer magnitude and diversity of genetic information that the Human Genome Project will
produce,” and the “current rapid evolution of genetic diagnostic testing,” “raises questions about
whether health care professionals are necessarily the most appropriate source” of disclosure
predicated on a duty to warn, which is found in “cases recognizing causes of action for wrongful
life and wrongful birth, finding [the] duty to warn a patient of newly-discovered risks from
previously rendered services, and allowing breaches of confidentiality to protect third parties.”).
80. Amy L. McGuire et al., Can I Be Sued For That? Liability Risk and the Disclosure of
Clinically Significant Genetic Research Findings, 24 GENOME RES. 719, 720 (2014).
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would do under similar circumstances.” 81 Falling below the standard of care is
evidenced by a breach of duty owed by the physician to a patient. 82 Generally,
negligence may take the form of either disclosure or nondisclosure. In the
context of genetic testing, an action of nondisclosure pertains to that “conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.” 83 By contrast, an action of disclosure
“must [be done] competently” while being “consistent with standard practice”
and “seek[ing] to maximize the analytic and clinical validity of findings.” 84
Premised on these two negligence bases, there is precedent concerning
incidental findings for medical imaging, which might provide a foundation
upon which the standard of care may begin to take shape and consequently
determine a threshold for liability in the genomic context. 85
Case law suggests that clinicians may be held liable for failing to disclose
incidental findings in the context of medical imaging. 86 The liability in these
cases was generally premised on the assumption that the patients
“would have [been] offered an opportunity to prevent or alter the course of
future disease,” if under the applicable standard of care, health care providers
“fail to identify or appreciate the significance of an [incidental finding,] or [if]
they [negligently] fail to notify other clinicians and/or the patient of an
87
identified [incidental finding].”

Case law further suggests that the determinative factor for liability was the
potential for a result to inform medical interventions aimed at improving the
health outcome of the person tested. 88 It is expected that in addition to
negligence-based breach of duty claims, physicians might face the threat of
other litigation claims. 89 Physicians’ options in these other litigation contexts
have also been clarified and might be influential as whole genome sequencing

81. Id.
82. Id. Physicians may be found negligent if all elements are satisfied: duty, breach of duty,
causation between the duty and breach of duty, injury as a consequence, and compensable
damages for the injury suffered. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 721.
85. Clayton et al., supra note 69, at 626-27.
86. See, e.g., Lo v. Burke, 455 S.E.2d 9, 9 (Va. 1995); Davy v. Schiffer, 2008 NY Slip Op
31556(U) (Sup. Ct. June 6, 2008); Durham v. County of Maui, No. 08-00342, 2010 WL 2943358,
at *13 (D. Haw. July 28, 2010); Cooper v. Ciccarelli, No. 07-2434, 2009 WL 539911, at *6-7 (D.
Kan. Mar. 4, 2009); Workman v. O’Bryan, 944 N.E.2d 61, 68 (Ind. App. 2011); Stallworth v.
Boren 54 P.3d 923 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002); Riley v. Stone, 900 A.2d 1087 (R.I. 2006); Cifaretto v.
Dalton, No. L-476-07 2011 WL 831867 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 11, 2011).
87. Clayton et al., supra note 69, at 624.
88. Id.
89. Marchant et al., supra note 43, at 459-61. Some of these other claims include failure to
recognize genetic risk, loss of chance, informed consent, and failure to warn. Id.
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and other personalized medicine techniques are incorporated into clinical
care. 90
B.

Duty to Warn and Foreseeability of Imminent Danger

Another legal challenge facing the integration of the results generated
through whole genome sequencing technologies is that many providers are
concerned they will be held liable for failure to address the results generated
through such technology. 91 Even though liability claims of this nature would
be of first impression in courts of law or equity, 92 providers have already been
held accountable for their failure to warn third parties of their genetic risk for
developing a certain illness or disease. 93 Before diving into these negligence
cases in the Florida Supreme Court and the New Jersey Appellate Court, 94 one
may consider a case determining whether an imminent danger was within the
scope of a physician’s standard of care. In that case, the California Supreme
Court carved out an exception to the strictly-held physician-patient fiduciary
relationship in the context of foreseeability. This case set the stage for the
subsequent negligence cases in Florida and New Jersey. Using a provider’s
“duty to warn” as a context for understanding the standard of care as a
consequence of the courts’ rulings in these cases will provide a beginning
framework by which the standard of care may take shape in the genomic
context.
1. The Tarasoff “Imminent Danger” Rule
In the mid-1970s, the California Supreme Court weighed in on whether a
psychologist employed by the University of California could be held liable for
failure to warn a third-party of impending danger to that third-party’s life. 95 In

90. Id. The case law explains physicians’ options are “knowing the information and doing
the counseling themselves, or referring the patient to a [more suitable specialist.]” Id. See
Findley-Smith v. Smith, No. 01-07-00360, 2008 WL S25813, at *7 (Tex. App. 2008).
91. See generally Ribhi Hazin et al., Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of
Incorporating Genomic Information into Electronic Health Records, 15 GENETICS MED. 810,
814-15 (2013). This “failure to address” issue is subsumed under the “duty to warn” standard. Id.
As Hazin et al. has articulated, the duty to warn needs to be further clarified, and will inevitably
be transformed, as physicians gain access to a greater amount of information that can “forecast
medical risks.” Id. A line is distinctively drawn however, between disclosing that information
related directly to the patient and that information that might relate to the patient’s relatives
(emphasis added). Id. at 815. HIPAA precludes, in most cases, those warnings given to relatives
that overrule objections of the patient. Id.
92. See supra Section III.A.
93. Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
94. These cases illustrate the potential ethical dubiousness of health care providers allegedly
failing to meet their duties to warn of patient’s children of parents with particular diseases who
ended up developing the same disease as their parent.
95. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
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Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the court held that the
psychologist could not escape liability merely upon the fact that the third-party
was outside of the privileged relationship. 96 The psychologist was under a duty
to use reasonable care to protect the third-party against imminent danger upon
learning 97 of the threat of serious danger to that third-party by the patient
within the privileged relationship. Once that threat of imminent danger became
present, the duty to warn arose. Considering the nature and context of the case
and its particular circumstances, the psychologist may have discharged his duty
by warning the third-party of the imminent threat or danger, notifying the
police, or taking any reasonable steps necessary given the present
circumstances. 98
In that case, Poddar, a student of the University of California, voluntarily
committed himself to psychological help from the defendant’s employed
psychologist, where he confided in that psychologist his intent to kill Tatiana
Tarasoff. 99 The psychologist notified the campus police, who detained Poddar
for a brief period of time before releasing him, claiming that the psychologist’s
superior directed no further action to be taken given that Poddar was rational
and promised not to follow-through with his intent to kill Tarasoff. 100 Upon
returning home from studying abroad, Poddar confronted Tarasoff and killed
her. 101
Pursuant to amendments to the allegations asserted by the plaintiffs, 102 the
court concluded that the plaintiffs could state a cause of action against the
defendant’s psychologist for negligent failure to protect Tarasoff. 103 The
plaintiffs’ amendment asserted that their daughter’s death “proximately
resulted from [the psychologist’s] negligent failure to warn” their daughter. 104
In response, the psychologist contended that given the nature and
circumstances of the case at hand, he did not owe a duty of care to Tarasoff or
her parents and that, “in the absence of such duty, [he was] free to act in
careless disregard of [Tarasoff’s] life and safety.” 105 The court disagreed with
this contention.

96. Id. at 340.
97. Id. (stating that this would need to be based upon the psychologist’s professional
determination or in accordance with the standards of his profession).
98. Id.
99. Daughter of the plaintiff’s asserting allegations against the defendant university. Id. at
339.
100. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339-40.
101. Id. at 341.
102. Id. at 339-40 (Tarasoff’s parents).
103. Id. at 342.
104. Id.
105. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
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Recognizing context as a salient factor in analyzing and making a
determination upon the issue, the court set forth a framework of rules and
public policy upon which it rendered its decision. First, the court
acknowledged that “legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but
merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability
should be imposed for damage done.” 106 Making an assertion that one does not
have liability because one does not have a duty to act in a certain way in the
first place begs the question: “whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to
legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.” 107 The duty formed upon this
consideration was premised on considerations of public policy. Articulating the
justifications of particular duty standards by courts in preceding cases, the
court here recognized the imposition of liability “for [an] injury occasioned to
another by his want of ordinary care or skill” when the circumstances have
“placed [that person] in such a position with regard to [the other].” 108 The
absence of exercising ordinary care and skill in one’s conduct gave rise to the
duty to avoid danger that might be caused as a consequence. 109
However, the court diverted on the balancing test set forth in Merrill v.
Buck. 110 Instead, the court firmly asserted that the most important factor to be
considered is that of foreseeability, which relates to owing a fiduciary duty to
those who are foreseeably endangered by one’s conduct, “with respect to all
risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.” 111 However, the court
distinguished this generally accepted principle from that which relates to
special relationships, such as a relationship that a patient shares with his or her
psychologist. The factor distinguished was that liability would only be imposed
if the defendant did not control the conduct of another person, or warn of such
conduct. The existence of the type of relationship unique to these
circumstances did not necessitate the court to determine “whether
foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect a potential victim of another’s conduct.” 112 Courts have carved out an
exception premised upon the rule where there are special relationships either to
“the person whose conduct needs to be controlled” or “the foreseeable victim
of that conduct.” 113

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Merrill v. Buck, 375 P.2d 304, 310 (Cal. 1962).
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
Id. at 343.
Id.
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Upon this exception, the court reasoned that there existed a special
relationship that necessitated a duty of care by the psychologist. 114 This type of
relationship was “sufficient to support the duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect others against dangers emanating from [circumstances related to] the
patient’s illness.” 115 However, the court did recognize important complexities
related to making judgments that fall within the “reasonable care” standard in
the first place, namely “forecast[ing] whether a patient presents a serious
danger of violence.” 116 The reasonableness of a psychologist’s actions are
based upon standards of treatment and practices of that particular specialty,
and practitioners are given the freedom to exercise their best judgment without
liability. 117 Once a determination has been made (or should have been made)
under the applicable professional standards that a danger exists to a third-party,
then that practitioner “bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger.” 118 Social policy, not professional expertise,
is the guidance for resolving the conflict between a patient’s interests 119 and a
potential victim. 120 Therefore, the court held that “public policy favoring
protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist
communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to
avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril
begins.” 121
The holding in Tarasoff provides a foundation upon which the issue of
foreseeability may be discussed in the context of genomic testing generally.
Specifically, this context begs the question, as has been posed before: “[A]re
genetic risks sufficiently similar to [the] existing exceptions to the requirement

114. See id. at 345 (stating that this relationship was similar in nature to that of a physicianpatient relationship).
115. Id. at 344.
116. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (acknowledging that psychologists “need only exercise ‘that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members
of [that professional specialty] under similar circumstances.’”).
117. Id.
118. Id. However, the decision rendered by each psychologist (or therapist) will be different
for each case because of the particular circumstances. Id. Thus, the adequacy of that decision will
be measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under
the circumstances. Id.
119. Id. at 347. The patient’s interests include having information remain confident in the
special relationship. Id. This is in accordance with the Principles of Medical Ethics of the
American Medical Association (1957): “A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to
him in the course of medical attendance . . . unless he is required to do so by law or unless it
becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.” Id.
120. Id. The potential victim is one who might be the subject of the patient’s dangerous
conduct. Id. This is in accordance with the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical
Association (1957). Id.
121. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347.
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of confidentiality that they warrant an exception as well?” 122 The resounding
opinion from advisory boards has been “no,” 123 but given that these
professional opinions only have persuasive authority, one may now turn to two
negligence cases determining the issue of failure to warn of genetic risks,
which still hold the force of law today.
2. Pate v. Threlkel
Relying on the establishment of a foreseeable risk of harm, the Florida
Supreme Court in Pate v. Threlkel held that a physician’s duty to warn was
satisfied by informing the patient that her children may have an increased risk
of developing a particular illness or disease, but then the patient had a
responsibility to warn her children of their potential risk. 124 In that case, the
issue before the Florida Supreme Court was whether a physician owed a duty
of care to the children of a patient to warn the patient of the genetically
transferable nature of the condition for which the physician is treating the
patient. 125 The plaintiff’s 126 case was comprised of four medical malpractice
allegations, 127 the bases of which rested upon the physician’s negligence being
a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s suffering from advanced
medullary thyroid carcinoma. 128

122. Ellen Wright Clayton, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Genomic Medicine, 349
NEW ENG. J. MED. 562, 567 (2003).
123
123. See COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 22 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994); see also B. M.
Knoppers et al., Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information, 62 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 474, 474 (1998); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC
CONDITIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC
SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 42-45 (1983).
124. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1995).
125. Id.
126. Id. (daughter of physicians’ patient who had medullary thyroid carcinoma).
127. Id. The four allegations were: (1) the “physicians knew or should have known of the
likelihood that [the patient’s] children would have inherited the condition genetically;” (2) “the
physicians were under a duty to warn [the patient] that her children should be tested for the
disease;” (3) “had [the patient] been warned [when the patient was diagnosed and received
treatment in 1987 for her medullary thyroid carcinoma], she would have had her children tested at
that time;” and (4) “if [the plaintiff] had been tested [at the time her mother had been diagnosed
and treated], she would have taken preventative action, and her condition, more likely than not,
would have been curable.” Id.
128. Id. The court acknowledged that medullary thyroid carcinoma was a “genetically
transferable disease,” but the record was devoid of evidence indicating that the parent received a
genetic test to confirm. Id. Likewise, the patient’s daughter argued that had she known of the
likelihood of her mother’s genetically transferable disease—that of medullary thyroid
carcinoma—then she would have sought genetic testing for the disease and could have taken
preventive measures in order to potentially cure her of the disease. Id.
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Finding for the physicians at the district court and appellate levels, the
Florida Supreme Court reviewed the physician’s argument that the plaintiff
had not established a fiduciary physician-patient relationship. 129 The focus of
the court’s reasoning was whether there was a duty in the first place. 130 As
provided in McCain v. Florida Power Corp., Florida recognizes that “a legal
duty will arise whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and
foreseeable risk of harming others.” 131 Finding that the focus on duty was
relevant to the case at hand, the Florida Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
its reasoning by applying the relevant Florida statute pertaining to the duty
owed by health care providers in a medical malpractice case. 132 The court
applied the standard to the case at hand and concluded that “a duty exists if the
statutory standard of care requires a reasonably prudent health care provider to
warn a patient of the genetically transferable nature of the condition for which
the physician was treating the patient.” 133 Assuming that the plaintiff’s factual
allegation in the complaint was true and basing its decision upon the fact that
the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the
physicians, the court accepted them, but ordered for them to be determined by
the pertinent Florida statute. 134
The next sub-issue explored by the court involved determining “to whom
does the alleged duty to warn [the plaintiff] of the nature of her disease run.” 135
Privity was of significance here given that the duty was predicated upon the
patient who was in privity with the physician. However, the rights of third
parties had been recognized in the judicial system. 136 Thus, the fact that the
plaintiff was not part of the physician-patient relationship did not foreclose
liability for the physician treating the plaintiff’s mother if a duty of care was
otherwise established. 137 The court reasoned that the “analysis recognizing that
privity is not always needed to establish liability should apply to the
professional relationship between a patient’s child and a health care
provider.” 138
Consequently, the court concluded that “when the prevailing standard of
care creates a duty that is obviously for the benefit of certain identified third
parties and the physician knows of the existence of those third parties, then the

129. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279-80.
130. Id. at 280.
131. Id. (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992)).
132. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.102 (1989)).
133. Id.
134. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 281.
135. Id.
136. Id. (listing cases recognizing third-party rights).
137. Id. at 281-82 (citing Pensacola Exec. House Condo. Ass’n v. Baskerville-Donovan
Eng’rs, Inc., 566 So. 2d 850, 852-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
138. Id. at 282.
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physician’s duty runs to those third parties.” 139 Extending this conclusion, the
Florida Supreme Court further concluded that because the physician was
“prohibited from disclosing the patient’s medical condition to others except
with the patient’s permission,” then the duty that the health care provider owed
to the patient is satisfied when the physician warns the patient. 140 Because
there was evidence and case law to support a potential recovery for the plaintiff
on the medical malpractice claim, the Florida Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that the trial court erred in its dismissal and granting of summary
judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 141
3. Safer v. Estate of Pack
In contrast to Pate v. Threlkel, the New Jersey Appellate Court in Safer v.
Estate of Pack held that a physician’s duty to warn extended beyond informing
the patient of her genetic risk of developing a particular illness or disease,
including the patient’s children. In that case, the issues before the New Jersey
Appellate Court were: whether a physician had a duty to warn those known to
be at risk of avoidable harm from a genetically transmissible condition;
whether a physician’s duty extended to members of the immediate family of a
patient who may be adversely affected by a breach of duty; and whether a
physician had breached the duty owed. 142 The plaintiff, who was not a patient
of the defendant physician, alleged that the physician should have warned her
about her fifty percent risk of having multiple polyposis, which led to
metastatic colon cancer. 143 The plaintiff premised her allegation upon the
contention that multiple polyposis was a hereditary condition, that this
hereditary nature was known by the physician, and that the physician, having
this knowledge, was required by prevailing medical standards to “warn those at
risk so that they might have the benefits of early examination, monitoring,
detection, and treatment, that would provide opportunity to avoid the most
baneful consequences of the condition.” 144
The New Jersey Appellate Court challenged the trial court’s judgment that
the physician had “no legal duty to warn a child of a patient of a genetic
risk.” 145 The trial court’s rationale was premised upon the legal standard that
“in order for a [physician] to have a duty to warn, there must be a
patient/physician relationship or circumstances requiring the protection of the

139. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 282.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1189 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
143. Id. at 1190 (the same cancer the plaintiff developed over twenty-five years after her
father died of it).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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public health or the community at large.” 146 Pate v. Threlkel was the guiding
case for the trial court’s decision, which subsequently affected the appellate
court’s acceptance of the asserted factual allegations. 147 The prevailing
medical standard included in these allegations was defined as that “standard of
care, knowledge, and skill . . . ‘which is ordinarily possessed and exercised in
similar situations by the average member of the profession practicing in the
field.’” 148 While determining whether the physician’s actions comported with
the prevailing medical standard was a matter for the factfinder, determining
whether there was a legal duty to act in a certain way was a matter of law.
Likening a genetically transmissible condition to infections, contagions, or
threats of physical harm, the court recognized that potential future harm “may
be averted or minimized by a timely and effective warning.” 149 Consequently,
the court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling that the physician “breached no
duty because avoidable harm to [the plaintiff] was not foreseeable.” 150 Relying
upon precedent, the court contended that the duty was to be “seen as owed not
only to the patient himself but that it also ‘extend[ed] beyond the interests of a
patient to members of the immediate family of the patient who may be
adversely affected by a breach of that duty.’” 151
Thus, the court decided to distinguish itself from the ruling in Pate v.
Threlkel, holding that “the duty to warn” is not always “satisfied by [simply]
informing the patient.” 152 Rather, certain circumstances might necessitate the
“physician’s broader duty to warn and his fidelity to an expressed preference
of the patient that nothing be said to family members about the details of the
disease.” 153 However, similar to the Pate v. Threlkel court, the court here
decided to remand the case for further proceedings given that there were
serious and conflicting medical, social, and legal policies being implicated in
the case. 154

146. Id.
147. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1191 (including the plaintiff’s assertion that the prevailing medical
standard “required the physician to warn of the known genetic threat”).
148. Id. (quoting Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 584 (N.J. 1964)).
149. Id. at 1192.
150. Id. (namely, that the physician’s conduct did not create a “foreseeable zone of risk”).
151. Id. (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 838 (N.J. 1981)).
152. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192.
153. Id. at 1192-93.
154. Id. at 1193; see also Sonia M. Suter, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial
Conflicts over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1870-72 (1993)
(identifying some of these implications); Janet A. Kobrin, Confidentiality of Genetic
Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1305-06 (1983).
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4. Implications for Framing the Standard of Care in the Genomics
Context
The aforementioned cases had tremendous implications for the fiduciary
role of physicians given that privacy and confidentiality are both fundamental
to any physician-patient relationship and now protected by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 155 The Pate and Safer
cases in particular are guiding for an analysis as to how they contextualize a
new standard of care for physicians with the advent of whole genome
sequencing. In those cases, even though the children were not under the direct
care of the physician, the courts ruled that a standard of care still applied
because of the delicate issue pertaining to genetic information, namely that of
foreseeability, as previously established in Tarasoff. 156 When the physicians’
actions did not conform to the expectations of a standard of care, 157 the courts
ruled that the duty to care was breached. This breach of duty was further
supported by the fact that the plaintiffs in both cases developed the same
illness or disease 158 that their parent had previously developed. Thus, the
breach of duty had caused an injury that could have been avoided if the
plaintiffs had taken preventive measures.
Pate and Safer have been criticized for their legal reasoning and deviation
from ethical guidelines. 159 However, they have not yet been overturned and, by
common law rule, they may prove persuasive in other states and circuits. Had
HIPAA been enacted prior to the courts’ rulings, the courts might have held
differently. There might not have been a duty owed, and, thus, no breach.
Likewise, even though the children suffered injury (in the form of suffering
from the same illness as their parent) in each of the cases, it might not have
been the result of a breach of duty. Medical negligence might not have been
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries of developing the same illness or
disease as their parents. Courts ought to use caution when analyzing and
applying the reasoning in these cases as they may adversely affect physicians

155. Anne-Marie Laberge & Wylie Burke, Duty to Warn At-Risk Family Members of
Genetic Disease, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 656, 658 (2009). Tarasoff was decided in 1976,
while Pate was decided in 1995, Safer was decided in July 1996, and HIPAA was enacted in
August 1996. HIPAA allows exceptions to the strict nondisclosure policy in the case of
serious and imminent threat to the public or to an identifiable third party when the physician
has the capacity to avert the harm. Id. However, it is unclear for now whether the threat of
cancer associated with hereditary cancer predispositions would fall under this exception. Id.
156. Id. at 657-58.
157. Id. (discussing the failure to warn the patient’s children of their foreseeable potential
genetic risk.).
158. See Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1995); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d
1188, 1189-1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
159. Clayton, supra note 122, at 567.
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in future negligence cases involving a not-yet-defined standard of care as it
pertains to whole genome sequencing.
Nevertheless, in the wake of these cases, the issue of disclosure has been
taken up by many professional organizations, including the American Society
of Human Genetics 160 (ASHG) and the President’s Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Research, 161 which advocate
for methodologies allowing disclosure, while others argue disclosure is not
warranted to the extent offered by the aforementioned organizations. 162 The
articulated cases and consequent responses at the organizational level
pertaining to the issues of disclosure, seriousness, foreseeability, probability of
harm, and an identifiable medically-accepted standard of care might provide a
framework by which a new threshold for a “duty to warn” is created. In order
to understand how this novel framework might be structured, one may look to
the roles of genetic counselors as an analogy when educating and informing
potential parents of their future child’s genetic abnormality or mutation.

160. Kristin E. Schleiter, A Physician’s Duty to Warn Third Parties of Hereditary Risk, 11
AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 697, 699 (2009) (quoting ASHG’s Policy Statement advocating “a
two [prong] approach to disclosure that respects confidentiality of genetic information while
acknowledging that the information is both individual and familial in nature.”). The first prong
requires physicians, acting under a standard duty of care, informing patients prior to and
following testing about the familial implications of genetic testing. Id. This prong preserves
the duty of confidentiality. The second prong is triggered once the physician has satisfied the
first requirement of warning the patient. The physician may now use discretion in notifying
at-risk family members of the patient when four factors are present: “[1] Attempts to
encourage disclosure on the part of the patient have failed. [2] The harm is highly likely to
occur and is serious and foreseeable. [3] The at-risk relative is identifiable. [4] The disease is
preventable, treatable, or medically accepted standards indicate that early monitoring will
reduce the genetic risk.” Id.; see also Mary L. Kovalesky, To Disclose or Not to Disclose:
Determining the Scope and Exercise of a Physician’s Duty to Warn Third Parties of
Genetically Transmittable Conditions, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1034 (2008).
161. Schleiter, supra note 160, at 699 (“Disclosure without the patient’s consent is justified
only if: (1) Reasonable efforts to elicit voluntary consent to disclosure have failed; (2) There is a
high probability both that harm will occur if the information is withheld and that the disclosed
information will actually be used to avert harm; (3) The harm that the identifiable individuals
would suffer would be serious; and (4) Appropriate precautions are taken to ensure that only the
genetic information needed for diagnosis or treatment of the disease in question is disclosed.”);
see also AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT 9: A-03,
DISCLOSURE OF FAMILIAL RISK IN GENETIC TESTING (2007) [hereinafter REPORT 9: A-03].
162. Schleiter, supra note 160, at 699. For example, The AMA Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs’ “Code of Medical Ethics” and the American Society of Clinical Oncology’s
“Policy Statement on Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility.” See REPORT 9: A-03, supra note
161. These organizations hold that a physician should address the issue of communicating genetic
test results to family members, and is not required to reach out to at-risk family members. Id.
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IV. FINDING GUIDANCE IN BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS
The aforementioned legal precedent provides an initial framework by
which the potential standard of care may take shape. In addition to setting this
legal stage, consideration must be lent for those stakeholders likely to be (or
that already have been) involved or directly affected by whole genome
sequencing. Within the set of evident stakeholders, one may find best practice
standards that may be guiding for physicians who will be directly impacted.
Genetic counselors, in particular, are a sufficient source for framing the
discussion about how physicians may become educated about whole genome
sequencing and, consequently, potentially held liable for a standard of care that
will inevitably transform as whole genome sequencing takes root in the clinical
setting.
A.

Frontline of Stakeholders

Finding, as detailed above, that patients themselves lack the “expertise
required to convert genetic data” into meaningful medical information, 163 some
have posited that there are a considerable number of potential health care
professionals who can be in a position to manage, return, and interpret the
genetic data. Among these are “molecular and computational biologists,
geneticists, pathologists and physicians with exquisite knowledge of the
disease and of treatment modalities, research nurses, genetic counselors, and
information technology and systems support specialists.” 164
One of the stakeholders identified is already leading the way in interpreting
whole genome sequencing testing results. The College of American
Pathologists has “launched a concerted effort to position pathologists as an
essential leader of the medical team versed in genetic and genomic testing.” 165
Available are online education resources for enhancing their skills and
knowledge in “the revolutionary diagnostic and treatment competency area”
that is genomic medicine. 166 However, work still needs to be done at the
forefront of interpreting and managing the information in the first place. The
current need for management and interpretation has not yet been matched as
163. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at 730 (explaining that this conversion involves
the diagnosis, curing, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of a disease “in and of itself”).
164. Id. (quoting Elaine R. Mardis, The $1,000 Genome, the $100,000 Analysis?, 2
GENOME MED. 84, 84 (2010)).
165. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 4.
166. Genomics and Molecular Medicine Education & Resources, C. AM. PATHOLOGISTS,
http://www.cap.org/web/home/resources/genomics-molecular-medicine-education-resources/
genomics-molecular-medicine-tools-resources?_adf.ctrl-state=c54pr7twi_4&_afrLoop=2818110
77566085#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D281811077566085%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Db5pthehy4_4 (last
visited June 25, 2015) (discussing online courses available include those related to genomics,
pharmacogenomics, molecular medicine, next generation sequencing, and genetic/genomics
competency).
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the information and the testing technologies generating this information have
outpaced providers’ and pathologists’ ability to manage and interpret the data
in clinically meaningful ways. 167 Pathologists might be a resource for
information about genetic and genomic testing technologies, but the physician
will still be at the forefront for the medical care and treatment a patient
receives. Physicians are the source of accountability and reliability for patients
as patients make medical decisions in their lives.
While pathologists might be in a position to educate themselves about the
interpretation of data, the communication and established-relationship with
patients is absent. The same can be said of the other stakeholders identified
above, 168 with the exception of physicians and genetic counselors. Given that a
physician’s role has radically changed with the advent of whole genome
sequencing technologies, one may observe how physicians may not yet be
adequately prepared in their clinical practices to address patient concerns
pertaining to the genetic results they receive. Best practice standards might be
found in genetic counseling, as genetic counselors have experience and are
directly educated for the purposes of managing, interpreting, communicating,
and advising patients on their options.
B.

Best Practice Standards in Genetic Counseling

Newborn and prenatal screening have already benefitted from the fruits of
and advancements in genetic testing technologies, 169 and have become
commonplace in the health care setting. 170 The standards by which these
genetic tests are carried out and subsequently interpreted and communicated to
parents of potential children may provide a framework upon which other
genetic test results may be used in a clinically meaningful way, such as
infectious and rare diseases. Already, the path has been paved for better
167. But see Euan A. Ashley et al., Clinical Assessment Incorporating a Personal Genome,
375 LANCET 1525, 1525 (2010); see also id. at 1533 (“[It] provides an approach to
comprehensive analysis of a human genome in a defined clinical context . . . results of the
study provide proof of principle that clinically meaningful information can be derived about
disease risk and response to drugs in patients with whole genome sequence data.”)
168. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 2, at 728; see also id. at 744 n.435 (“[S]ome
scholars. . .have called for researchers to provide research participants access to their raw
genetic data to, among other things, give participants the option of their independent
analysis.”); Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., Raw Personal Data: Providing Access, 343 SCIENCE
373, 374 (2014) (evaluating returning results in different contexts).
169. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 2.
170. Id.; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, RE: 21ST CENTURY CURES: EXAMINING THE
REGULATION OF LABORATORY-DEVELOPED TESTS 3 (2014), http://docs.house.gov/meetings
/if/if14/20140909/102625/hhrg-113-if14-20140909-sd005.pdf
(discussing
how
“[Laboratory-Developed Tests] providing genetic and next-generation testing and screening
have already become common in certain medical specialties. For [example], newborn
screening is universal, and carrier, pre-implantation and prenatal testing is commonplace.”).
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treatment options and thus better outcomes for patients with Huntington’s
disease, which is the disease proven to have a 100% accurate genotypephenotype relationship. 171
Hospitals are allocating resources to oncology departments to establish
stable infrastructures that will support “widespread adoption of genomic-based
testing and treatment” with the hopes of “propel[ling] adoption of personalized
medicine as a standard of care in diagnosis, risk assessment and treatment.” 172
For example, Vanderbilt University Medical Center clinicians are engaged as
part of a core development team with geneticists, informaticists, electronic
health record (EHR) experts, pharmacists, pharmacologists, clinical
pathologists, and program managers in the Pharmacogenomic Resource for
Enhanced Decisions in Care and Treatment (PREDICT) project. 173 Vanderbilt
University is one of a few academic medical centers currently engaged in
implementing clinical decision support tools for the practical application and
facilitation of genomic information in patient care. 174As others have argued,
these institutions “must play a central role in unleashing the potential of
[personalized health care].” 175
In the specific case of breast cancer, it has become well-known that the
genotype-phenotype association between this disease and mutations in
BRCA 176 is almost as strong as that association for Huntington’s disease and

171. See Walker, supra note 31, at 225.
172. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 2.
173. Jill M. Pulley et al., Operational Implementation of Prospective Genotyping for
Personalized Medicine: The Design of the Vanderbilt PREDICT Project, 92 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 87, 88 (2012).
174. See Andrea Hartzler et al., Stakeholder Engagement: A Key Component of Integrating
Genomic Information into Electronic Health Records, 15 GENETICS MED. 792, 794-96
(2013), for a discussion on others like Northwestern University, the Mayo Clinic, Marshfield
Clinic, and the University of Washington.
175. Geoffrey S. Ginsburg et al., Academic Medical Centers: Ripe for Rapid-Learning
Personalized Health Care, 3 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Sept. 21, 2011, at 1. The potential for
personalized health care, which relies upon personalized medicine, can be unleashed by academic
medical centers because they “act[] as a nexus for discovery, development, and dissemination of
tools and clinical health care-delivery models,” that can overcome the uncoordinated research
environment and disjointed translational-research infrastructure that hinders personalized health
care from reaching its expected and meaningful potential. Id. Given the resources available and
state-of-the-art, robust technological equipment capabilities, academic medical centers may
provide opportunities for “train[ing] [the] next generation of MDs in genomics and [personalized
health care]” so as to promote literacy in the area and reform medical education to account for the
growing body of knowledge in personalized medicine and health care. Id. at 1-2.
176. See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST. NAT’L
INST. HEALTH, (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA
[hereinafter NAT’L CANCER INST.].
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an HTT genetic mutation. 177 For some, BRCA has become the “gold
standard.” 178 Information about the genetic link between a patient having the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants is strong enough to influence patients with a
variant of BRCA to take preventive measures, such as a mastectomy. 179
Genetic testing for these variants are performed on women (and men) if there
is a family history of having the variant or a family history of having breast
cancer, or some combination thereof. 180 In those cases where the variants are
not able to be confirmed in a family member with breast cancer, then
physicians are encouraged to suggest that that patient receive genetic
counseling and offered the option for genetic testing for the variant. 181
Because breast cancer has a tremendous physical and emotional impact on
those diagnosed with the disease, a model for genetic counseling has been
developed that informs women at risk. 182 This two-level model consists of a
threshold evaluation level of the risks associated with BRCA variants and
breast cancer, and the genetic counseling level. 183 The threshold level is one of
evaluation by the physicians, who use specific tools to assess the likelihood of
a woman developing breast cancer considering the family history. 184 This
criteria is premised upon the sensitivity of breast cancer and genetic
susceptibility, and the fact that having one of the two BRCA variants is
extremely rare in the greater population. Family history, coupled with the
genotype-phenotype association provides a strong, sufficient-enough
framework upon which physicians may begin to communicate to their patients
about the risks of breast cancer and what can be done on a preventive basis. 185
This initiates the genetic counseling level provided from physicians.

177. Agatha M. Gallo et al., Disclosure of Genetic Information Within Families: How Nurses
Can Facilitate Family Communication, 109 AM. J. NURSING 65, 65-69 (2009).
178. AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, http://am.asco.org/multiplex-genetic-testing-inher
ited-cancer-future-now.
179. Id.; see also Gary N. McAbee et al., Physician’s Duty to Warn Third Parties about the
Risk of Genetic Diseases, 102 PEDIATRICS 140, 141 (1998) (“Advances in genetics that permit
some individuals to identify their risk for various types of cancer also permit these same
individuals to take prophylactic precautions” (e.g., total bilateral mastectomies or oophorectomies
in the cases of individuals who are carriers of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes who are at risk for
breast and ovarian cancer)).
180. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 176.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. These include: breast cancer diagnosed before age 50; cancer in both breasts;
both breast and ovarian cancers; multiple breast cancers; two or more primary of BRCA1- or
BRCA2-related cancers in a single family member; cases of male breast cancer; and Ashkenazi
Jewish ethnicity. Id.
185. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 176.
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The genetic counseling women receive includes, in addition to a heredity
cancer risk assessment based upon an individual’s personal and medical
history, information addressing a multitude of factors. 186 The factors have been
developed over time and with a greater scientific and medical understanding of
the genotype-phenotype relationship with BRCA variants and breast cancer.
These developments and growth in understanding have provided for a more
sufficient foundation upon which genetic counseling can provide an important
avenue for utilizing the genetic information in a clinically meaningful way.
This is indicative of and supports the validity and utility of the threshold level
of the physician evaluation. Not only does this avoid potential negative
consequences in patients who need not become anxious or fearful of
developing breast cancer when there is not family history to suggest a
susceptibility, but also enables physicians to focus on those who have a greater
susceptibility and utilize well the time with those patients informing them of
the aforementioned information.
C. How the Standard of Care May Take Shape Through Physician Education
While much literature has been written on the framework by which
genomic findings may be translated and returned to participants in the research
context, there is a gap pertaining to the same issue in the clinical context. As
such, there is an overwhelming lack of preparation for the influx of genetic
information among physicians. 187 As has been argued, integrating whole
genome sequencing technologies into patient care before “having [] the
knowledge base and clinical infrastructure required to support clinical genomic
testing” might be premature. 188 If whole genome sequencing is to be fully
integrated into patient care and interpreted to the patient’s benefit, then
prioritization of results through effective communication with the patient and
counseling of the patient once results are obtained are essential. 189
186. Id. These factors include: “The appropriateness of genetic testing[;] The medical
implications of a positive or a negative result;” the potential for ambiguity in the genetic test
result; “The possibility that a test result might not be informative[;] The psychological risks and
benefits of genetic test results[;] The risk of passing a mutation to children[;] . . . the technical
accuracy of the [specific genetic] test(s)” to be performed; and, the options available if the genetic
test returns a positive result. Id.
187. Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 922.
188. Sharp, supra note 10, at 191.
189. Id. at 192. The author identifies three issue areas that a clinician can, and should, play a
key role in resolving. The first involves informed consent: “If [whole genome sequencing
(WGS)] is to be integrated successfully into patient care, it is essential to establish that pretest
counseling can place patients in a position to make informed choices about genomic risk
assessment. Studies that evaluate pretest counseling for multiplexed forms of genetic testing are a
critical first step in establishing that it is possible to obtain genuinely informed consent to clinical
genomic testing.” Id. The second involves disclosing results to the patient and preparing for
lifelong follow-up in the physician-patient relationship: “the volume of data produced through
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Additionally, having sufficient numbers of physicians with specialty training
or education in genetics will be necessary if the benefits of the technology are
to be fully realized. 190
Despite a discrepancy in the model framework by which physicians may
interpret and implement genetic findings into the clinical setting in a
meaningful way for their patients, physicians, like researchers and commercial
providers, have already been suggested to “routinely make [their patients]
aware of the potential for [incidental findings].” 191 Putting their patients on
notice about this potential presupposes that clinical validity and utility has been
established. Once established, in any genomic context, physicians may begin to
adapt their practices to a reformed standard of care. The voluminous amount of
genomic information and the potential clinical utility of that information will
force physicians to seek education and transform their roles from providing not
only diagnostic and allopathic medicine, but also counseling. This reformed
standard of care may begin to take shape via “clear, credible, evidence-based,
and up-to-date clinical guidelines specifying when and where genetic testing
can be useful.” 192 These recommendations may be necessary to help guide a
WGS will greatly exceed an individual clinician’s capacity to present all relevant clinical findings
that are discovered,” and “clinical judgments will have to be made about the specific results to
prioritize in presenting diagnostic results from WGS.” Id. Disclosure of results might take the
form of future use of utilizing test results previously ascertained but not readily interpretable that
are now (in the future) interpretable with greater clinical utility, and “[a]s larger volumes of
personal genetic information are produced, it will be important to examine the criteria that
patients and clinicians use to assess the value of results from genomic testing.” Id. at 192-93.
Lastly, bundling of genetic tests may prove to be helpful, as WGS will require “significant
departures” from existing standards of care in clinical genetics, it is critical that this new form of
testing be introduced with care. Sharp, supra note 10, at 192. Although counterintuitive, the
author suggests that “the most direct path toward genomic medicine involves being more strategic
in developing smaller scale forms of multiplexed genetic testing that offer real-world settings in
which to study ethical and practical challenges that will be associated with the use of WGS in
patient care.” Id. at 193. Until ethical issues (e.g., informed consent and responsible management
of genetic information amounts) are addressed, physicians should be hesitant to use WGS for
genetic risk assessment. Id.
190. Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 922. Genetic counselors are also a viable option for
taking on this role despite the clinical encounter being different than that of a physician.
Currently, the number of genetic counselors and physicians with specialty training in genetics is
already inadequate (approximately 3,000 nationwide for each category). Id. “[P]roviders will be
increasingly confronted with genetic data or opportunities for useful genetic testing but, lacking
adequate genetics education and unable to access genetic specialists, may commit the types of
diagnostic errors that could lead to liability.” Id.
191. Shkedi-Rafid et al., supra note 40, at 715; see also PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF
INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TOCONSUMER CONTEXTS (2013), http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommuni
cate_PCSBI_0.pdf.
192. Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 922.
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physician’s clinical judgment and avoid, or at least provide a “partial shield
against,” malpractice liability. 193 As some have held, “understanding where
genetic testing might arguably be applicable to individual patients and
carefully documenting decisions and the associated rationales for
recommending or not recommending genetic testing for each patient” provides
for a more nuanced approach. 194
Some studies have even dived as deep as evaluating the roles of genetic
counseling from a psychological perspective. 195 In that study, in order to better
understand the genetic counselor’s role, “risk perception” was important. 196
The study ultimately found that this risk perception was inaccurate because of
certain predictors that influence the function or meaning of the process of
communication. 197 The takeaway is that the physician, assuming the role of
counselor, and the patient, assuming the role of counselee, must recognize how
they psychologically orient themselves prior to even beginning the
communication process. 198
D. Confrontation with Information Generated Through Whole Genome
Sequencing
Hypothesizing the future implications that the nature and potential of
genetic information will have on the physician-patient relationship, including

193. Id. As the authors have asserted: Defensive medicine is not the answer. Id. Neither is
recommending genetic testing when it is not clinically justified. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Joel Vos et al., A Counselee-Oriented Perspective on Risk Communication in
Genetic Counseling: Explaining Inaccuracy of the Counselee’s Risk Perception Shortly after
BRCA 1/2 Test Result Disclosure, 13 GENETICS MED. 800, 800 (2011). In that study, “genetic
counseling” was defined as the “process of helping people understand and adapt to the medical,
psychological, and familial implications of genetic contributions to disease,” which includes
communication of risk information and medical options based on these risks, which are calculated
on the basis of a pathogenic mutation DNA test result, or on the basis of pedigree information, in
combination with the counselee’s cancer history. Id.
196. See id. Risk perception was important in predicting the impact of genetic counseling:
counselee’s creation of own perception versus what is actually communicated by counselor. Id.
197. See id. Risk Perception is inaccurate because of either information-oriented (the function
of a process) or counselee-oriented (meaning of a process) predictors. Information-Oriented
Predictors focus on “how specific genetic information is communicated by the genetic counselor,
how it is received, processed, and reproduced by the counselee, and how these processes are
influenced by knowledge-related variables.” Id. at 800-01. Some of the predictors discussed
include “what information is communicated, levels of education and innumeracy, presence of
specific information about cancer in relatives and in counselees, and specific cognitive processes
regarding the processing of specific information.” Id. at 801. On the other hand, CounseleeOriented Predictors focus on “how the genetic information is experienced and fundamentally
embedded in the life of the counselee.” Id. Variable predictors include “the self, existential
concerns, and the need for certainty.” Vos et al., supra note 195, at 800-01.
198. See supra Section II.B.
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whether the clinical setting will or should be the venue by which genetic
information is disclosed to patients, is not a new discourse. 199 Advancements
in genetic testing technologies will require collaboration from the various
stakeholders, including physicians, 200 because “ethical, social, and legal issues
will continue to evolve as the technology itself evolves.” 201 Although the
“clinical research enterprise, technologies, and data required to implement
genetically-based preventive medicine on a personal basis” 202 have not yet
been fully realized, the reality of whole genome sequencing has been
established and will change the scope of the physician-patient relationship.
The physician’s role in addressing, managing, and advising the patient on
the validity and utility of genetic information is contingent upon the
physician’s prioritization of the results as they pertain to the patient. First, an
effective management method physicians may employ is a binning system. 203
This binning system allows for results to be “triaged,” which provides
physicians with a framework by which they may manage, interpret, and
communicate information to their patients. 204 The specific reporting criteria
Berg et al. proposed involves categorizing genotype-phenotype associations
into three “bins.” 205 The bin with the fewest results having “clinical utility” 206
would allow patients and physicians to focus on those most useful to the

199. See Andrews, supra note 79, at 184 (“In the future . . . the health care provider/patient
relationship may become an obsolete mechanism for transferring the bulk of genetic information.
If we as individuals or as a society are to make the best use of the growing genetic information,
we must develop a much greater understanding of the nature of genetics and its potential for
figuring into our major life decisions.”).
200. AMA Policy Perspective, supra note 9, at 5. These advancements “will require a
concerted effort on the part of the private and public sector, coupled with enhanced educational
efforts.” RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3.
201. RESOL. 422, A-05, supra note 3. It is also important to recognize salient considerations
when identifying and articulating the evolution of these ethical, social, and legal issues. These
advancements “will require a concerted effort on the part of the private and public sector, coupled
with enhanced educational efforts.” Id.
202. Id.
203. Berg et al., supra note 61, at 501; see also Westbrook et al., supra note 6, at 6 (citing and
discussing benefits and drawbacks of proposals in Berg et al.’s article).
204. Berg et al., supra note 61, at 501.
205. Id.; see also Westbrook et al., supra note 6, at 6. “Bin 1 would contain clinically valid
results that also carry clinical utility according to the current literature. Bin 2 would contain
clinically valid results that are not considered to be actionable. This bin is further stratified into
bins 2A, 2B, and 2C. Bin 2A would hold results that are unlikely to cause distress (such as risks
for common diseases) to patients, whereas Bin 2B and 2C would hold results that patients are
more likely to find distressing (such as risks for Alzheimer disease or Huntington disease). Bin 3
would contain results with unknown clinical implications and would thus hold the majority of
incidental findings.” Id.
206. This bin would house results with both clinical validity and utility according to the
literature. Westbrook et al., supra note 6, at 6.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

TRANSFORMING THE PHYSICIAN’S STANDARD OF CARE

145

patient in the clinical and diagnostic setting. 207 Management of this bin is
important as it will house the fewest and some of the most salient information
for the physicians to use in communicating to their patients. As such, the
criteria by which this information will get into the bin in the first place will
need to be adjusted with the generation of new information as technology
becomes more robust, and balanced with each other as some information may
be more salient than others given the particular patient.
A physician confronted with whole genome sequencing information may
choose to refer the patient to a genetic counselor for further education and
clarification as to the meaning of that genomic information. Exercising this
option may enable the physician to circumvent ethical and legal ramifications.
Not only will improving genomic literacy among physicians prove helpful, but
also improving genomic literacy among patients so as to elucidate their
expectations and preferences. “To promote patient participation in genomics,
the [United States] Department of Health and Human Services launched the
Personalized Health Care and Initiative Policy to facilitate patient
empowerment through genomics as a central priority of future health care
programs.” 208
For optimal utilization of genomic information in the clinical setting,
patients should be aware of the benefits and limitations of genomic testing.
Online educational tools are also available for patients to help them better
understand how genomics relates to their health. This program communicates
educational information to the patient with the hope that the patient takes
advantage of it prior to engaging in communication with the patient’s
provider. 209 Regardless of the source, communication still remains key.
E.

Future Implications on Potential Negligence Liability

Although literature has been published on negligence issues pertaining to
the return of results to research participants and involving whether, under what
circumstances, and how results should be returned, the discussion of
negligence in the clinical context may take similar form. It is not farfetched to
think of negligence actions in the context of returning whole genome
sequencing testing results because of the expectation that a physician will be
able to interpret the information generated and provide guidance to and for a
patient. For these particular instances, negligence may take the form of either
nondisclosure or disclosure, in a similar fashion as discussed above.
As has been previously documented, physician behavior tends to be driven
by a fear of liability. 210 As such, some have argued that a physician, acting in
207.
208.
209.
210.

Berg et al., supra note 61, at 502; Westbrook et al., supra note 6, at 6.
See generally Hazin et al., supra note 91, at 811.
See generally id.
McGuire et al., supra note 80, at 722.
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good faith and using professional expertise to make good, responsible
judgments, may have a defense against a negligence claim. 211 Framing this
potential in the context of the court rulings on a physician’s “duty to warn,”
defending against disclosure or nondisclosure will turn on the issue of
foreseeability, reasonableness, and the relative risk associated with each of the
findings. While leaving resolution of these issues to litigation may result in
“inconsistency across jurisdictions and court rulings that may not take into
account the full complexity of the issue[s],” 212 precedent might be established
if and when a patient believes he or she is owed a duty and the court needs to
weigh in on the issue and remedy the alleged wrong.
By contrast, others are concerned, anxious, and skeptical with the growing
consensus that returning the results of genomic research will become the
standard of care, which has the potential for giving way to malpractice liability
premised on negligence-based breach of duty. 213 Policy adequately addressing
the legal and ethical implications is necessary before the standard of care can
be reshaped. Policy will need to specifically address the belief that “[j]ust
because research data exists does not always make its clinical use compelling,
or even appropriate.” 214
Similar to the context of prenatal screening, liability is expected to be
“unpredictable and influential in changing medical practice” as personalized
medicine techniques become more widespread in their clinical application. 215
Interpretation and guidance on genomic testing results remain within the
province of the physician in the clinical setting. The burden of interpretation
upon which the physician is expected to act has not yet been established. This
burden, as it directly relates to the standard of care, might be shaped by (or
even take the shape of) certain legal elements such as foreseeability and
imminent danger.
The likelihood of developing a certain disease or illness predicated on a
particular genetic variant is not yet within the realm of foreseeability to the
extent that physicians will be held liable for falling below the standard of care.
Notwithstanding this lack of foreseeability issue, the standard of care itself has
yet to be defined for this particular context. The issue of foreseeability of
imminent danger as it relates to developing a particular disease or illness in the

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of
Genomics Research, 14 GENETICS MED. 473, 473 (2012). Although this concern involves the
threat of liability posed to researchers, the reality of concerns are both applicable and relevant to
discussions pertaining to the clinical setting.
214. Id. at 474. Here, the authors draw a line between research tests and clinical tests based
upon the reasons why those tests are conducted in the first place. Translating research-based
results into the clinical setting has ethical implications.
215. Marchant et al., supra note 43, at 457.
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presence or absence of a particular genetic variant might be analogized to the
weak relationship between clinical validity and clinical utility, their respective
significance in the clinical setting, and their gatekeeping threshold position for
unleashing this information’s use for the benefit of patients.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the two central tenets of Western medicine is that physicians should
focus on the interests of their patients. 216 This focus is guided by the standard
of care that physicians are expected to perform up to and that patients are
expected to receive from their physicians. In the case of genomic medicine and
unleashing its potential, determining the patient’s interests becomes a
challenge as the physician is expected to provide guidance to their patients, but
the information pertaining to genomic medicine has yet to be properly defined
and rendered clinically useful so that physicians may perform at the standard
of care expected. An assumption cannot be made that everyone who has access
to genomic information will reap its benefits. Whether people will actually use
the test results to alter their behavior in ways that improve health is still
uncertain. Some preventive or therapeutic measures are more likely to be
pursued than others. But the question still remains: How is a physician
expected to suggest preventive or therapeutic measures to patients with this
information when the clinical validity and utility has yet to be definitively
determined and is constantly changing, and the physician has yet to be properly
educated so as to provide clinically meaningful information to the patient,
which would also meet the standard of care?
The amount of information that has resulted, and is still to come, has been
analogized as a “tidal wave.” 217 Doubt exists as to whether we are paying
attention to it. 218 This article has argued that given the amount of literature,
adequate attention has been paid on account of recognizing the voluminous
amount of information, the challenges to implementing it effectively in the
clinical setting, and the potential for liability threats against physicians for
failing to address genomic results with their patients. These challenges will
take on a new identity as the standard of care expected of physicians adapts to
the reality of whole genome sequencing and its beneficial and detrimental
potential. It is not farfetched to hypothesize that a patient receiving this genetic
information would expect the physician to interpret and provide guidance for
the patient’s benefit.
Genetic counselors might be a good resource for patients to consult, but
given the inadequate number of counselors available in the United States, this
216. Clayton, supra note 122, at 566.
217. Is Genome Sequencing Surpassing Medical Knowledge?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 29,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130916257.
218. Id.
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inadequacy may impede the use of genomic testing in the clinical practice. 219 It
is evident that physicians, specifically primary care physicians, will be on the
frontline of using genomic medicine in mainstream care. 220 Although
physicians lack the requisite knowledge of genomics needed to provide
adequate counseling on the issues, 221 there are resources available for
physicians to take advantage of and increase their expertise in the area.
Education, management and interpretation skills, and expertise in the area
of genomics are important factors for determining the changing scope of a
physician’s legal duty to address all or at least some of the information
generated through whole genome sequencing. This will impact the standard of
care permeating throughout the profession. A physician’s potential duty as it
will be shaped by whole genome sequencing will be more fully realized as
physicians find guidance in best practice standards, which will have the effect
of enabling physicians with the ability to gain control and to facilitate the
clinical dialogue with their patients.
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219. Hazin et al., supra note 91, at 811-12. “There are only 3,026 board-certified genetic
counselors in the United States, and little effort is under way to expand genetic counseling
programs.” Id. at 811.
220. Id. at 812.
221. Id. (“The new dimension of genome-informed medical care is likely to further unmask
knowledge gaps in this area and increase the frequency of misinterpretations, thereby exposing
patients to medical risk.”).
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